


Growing technological opacity and the social brain

François Osiurak

University of Lyon, Lyon, France

Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France




Opacity

Opacity can be defined as the degree to which information is ***not accessible*** for cognitive processing.

Mechanically transparent



Mechanically opaque




Subjective

It depends on individual characteristics or experience

Opacity

....can take several forms



How was this object made?

*What knowledge do others
have of it?*

How does it work?

Making process

Transactional process

Using process



Overview



*Cultural
specialization*

*Tool
making*

Technical brain



Social brain


*Tool
use*

Not new: Csibra, Wegner, Keil, Dennett...

Technical versus social brain



Laws	Physical	Physical
	x	Psychological





Class of stimuli	Inanimate (non-intentional objects)	Animate (intentional agents)
------------------	--	---------------------------------


Perceptual properties

Perceptual signals (Bottom-up)


Class of stimuli	Inanimate (non-intentional objects)	Animate (intentional agents)
------------------	--	---------------------------------




animate/intentional vs inanimate/non-intentional object detection systems



Causal uncertainty (Top-down)




Technical brain




Mental simulation of mechanistic actions

Social brain



Theory of mind

(Social) Semantic memory
Knowledge about persons, groups, social behavior, etc.



How physical information is used to make sense of the psychological world

Shari Liu , Seda Karakose-Akbiyik, Joseph Outa & Minjae J. Kim

Nature Reviews Psychology 5, 59–73 (2026) | [Cite this article](#)


Table 1. The computational goals and principles, representations, and cortical systems associated with naive physics and naive psychology. Abbreviations: TPJ (temporoparietal junction), SPL/IPL (superior and inferior parietal lobule), PMC (premotor cortex), PC (precuneus), MPFC (medial prefrontal cortex).

	Naive physics	Naive psychology
General computational goal	Explain, predict and intervene on...	
Key representations	... the physical states and motions of objects OBJECT: an inanimate permanent body that persists through space and time OBJECT PROPERTIES: position, shape, mass, material RELATIONAL PROPERTIES: express interactions between objects; contact, support, containment, adhesion KINEMATIC / DYNAMIC PROPERTIES: speed, velocity, force	...the mental states and behaviors of agents AGENT: an animate entity that can change its own behaviors (i.e. act) at some cost, and has a perspective on (i.e. mental states about) the world MENTAL STATE: appraisal of a world state (e.g. cost, desire, emotion, knowledge, belief); in some cases a propositional attitude about that state (“she thinks the book is in the cabinet”) UTILITY: agents plan over this variable, composed of reward and cost
Causal law	Approximate Newtonian dynamics	Approximate rational planning
Judgments supported	Explanation: <i>Why?</i> ; Prediction: <i>What will happen next?</i> Counterfactuals: <i>What would have happened, if X were true?</i> Intervention: <i>What should I do, to make X happen?</i>	
	What is the mass, material, viscosity, and elasticity of this thing? Will it fall or stay stable? Why did it break, bounce, or flow the way it did?	What does she want, believe, or feel? What is she trying to do? Why did she do that?

How physical information is used to make sense of the psychological world

Shari Liu , Seda Karakose-Akbiyik, Joseph Outa & Minjae J. Kim

Nature Reviews Psychology 5, 59–73 (2026) | [Cite this article](#)




How physical information is used to make sense of the psychological world

Shari Liu  Seda Karakose-Akbiyik, Joseph Outa & Minjae J. Kim

Nature Reviews Psychology 5, 59–73 (2026) | [Cite this article](#)

A. Physical reasoning


Which way will it fall?
More yellow or brown blocks?



Schwettman et al. (2019)

B. Action Planning


Planning an action
Looking at an object



Brandi et al. (2014)

C. Action Observation

Body movement
Object movement




Ziccarelli et al. (2022)


These findings raise the possibility that the processes engaged by action observation, action planning and tool use, and physical reasoning may draw on a shared capacity: understanding how objects and agents (other people and ourselves) interact (see also ¹²⁰). These regions also exhibit strong intrinsic

Interactions

Social brain




Technical brain



Collaborative


Competitive





Long term

Short term

Long-term competition




A test of correlation between folk psychology and folk physics in the normal group was not possible since different groups of children were given each of these tests. In the group with AS, the two tasks were strongly inversely correlated ($r=-0.63$, $p=0.001$).




Long-term competition


$n = 110$




$n = 19$



$n = 74$



NV7



Interpersonal reactivity index (IRI)


"I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. ",

"I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. ",

"Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. ",

"I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. "

Unpublished data



fMRI reveals reciprocal inhibition between social and physical cognitive domains



Anthony I. Jack ^{a,*}, Abigail J. Dawson ^a, Katelyn L. Begany ^a, Regina L. Leckie ^a, Kevin P. Barry ^a, Angela H. Ciccia ^b, Abraham Z. Snyder ^c


ABSTRACT

Two lines of evidence indicate that there exists a reciprocal inhibitory relationship between opposed brain networks. First, most attention-demanding cognitive tasks activate a stereotypical set of brain areas, known as the task-positive network and simultaneously deactivate a different set of brain regions, commonly referred to as the task negative or default mode network. Second, functional connectivity analyses show that these same opposed networks are anti-correlated in the resting state. We hypothesize that these reciprocally inhibitory effects reflect two incompatible cognitive modes, each of which may be directed towards understanding the external world. Thus, engaging one mode activates one set of regions and suppresses activity in the other. We test this hypothesis by identifying two types of problem-solving task which, on the basis of prior work, have been consistently associated with the task positive and task negative regions: tasks requiring social cognition, i.e., reasoning about the mental states of other persons, and tasks requiring physical cognition, i.e., reasoning about the causal/mechanical properties of inanimate objects. Social and mechanical reasoning tasks were presented to neurologically normal participants during fMRI. Each task type was presented using both text and video clips. Regardless of presentation modality, we observed clear evidence of reciprocal suppression: social tasks deactivated regions associated with mechanical reasoning and mechanical tasks deactivated regions associated with social reasoning. These findings are not explained by self-referential processes, task engagement, mental simulation, mental time travel or external vs. internal attention, all factors previously hypothesized to explain default mode network activity.

*Short-term
competition*

Mechanical Movie		Would water flow if there was a large hole in the tube?	No
Social Movie		Does he think that she is angry?	No

*Short-term
competition*




Overlap

Physics > Rest, Social < Rest, fixed effects


Overlap

Social > Rest, Physics < Rest, fixed effects




Initial study: Vollm et al. (2006; NeuroImage)


Collaboration




D. Mentalizing task: PHYS-Only condition




F. Mentalizing task: INT+PHYS > PHYS-Only




E. Mentalizing task: INT+PHYS condition




A. Mechanical problem-solving task




A. Mechanical problem-solving task




B. Psychotechnical task






B. Psychotechnical task



G. Conjunction analysis (A and B and D and E)



Opacity and tool use





Review

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (2010) 383–388


Cell
PRESS

Causes and consequences of mind perception

Adam Waytz¹, Kurt Gray², Nicholas Epley³ and Daniel M. Wegner⁴

"People consistently use mental states to explain both human and non-human actions, particularly when they are unable to generate more elaborate causal explanations".

Instructions:
Tool action vs no-tool action



Tool condition

Instructions:

Tool action vs no-tool action




Machine condition

Instructions:
Tool action vs no-tool action



Control condition


Main fMRI results




Z score 3.1 5.4 3.1 4.9

Tool > Machine

Machine > Tool



Is this tool capable of...?



Tool



Machine

Instructions: *Work vs do not work*



**Machine condition
(work)**




Opaque

20 participants; 160 videoclips

Osiurak et al. (in progress)

Instructions: *Work vs do not work*



**Machine condition
(Do not work)**



Opaque

Instructions:
Work vs do not work



**Tool condition
(work)**




Transparent


Instructions:
Work vs do not work




**Tool condition
(Do not work)**

→ *Transparent*







Tool > Machine





Machine > Tool




Main fMRI results



Tool > Machine



Machine > Tool






Tool > Machine




Machine > Tool


Tool vs Machine



Tool vs Machine



Tool vs Machine



Making technology to our own image



*Improves again the
deception of the
social brain*

Thanks to my collaborators...



Giovanni Federico
Naples, Italy



Mathieu Lesourd
Besançon, France



Nicolas Claidière
Aix-Marseille, France




Yves Rossetti
Lyon, France

... and PhD students



Alexandre Bluet
Göteborg, Sweden



Maximilien Metaireau
Besançon, France



Chloé Bryche
Lyon, France



Nina Stauffert
Lyon, France




Anaïs Mercier
Lyon, France

Growing technological opacity and the social brain


François Osiurak

University of Lyon, Lyon, France


Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France




A. Mechanical > Digital




B. Digital > Mechanical




C. Alone > Delegation



D. Delegation > Alone






b. Brain-lesion studies

- Green: Goldenberg and Spatt (2009)
- Yellow: Goldenberg and Spatt (2009)
- Orange: Randerath et al. (2010)
- Blue: Mengotti et al. (2013)
- Red: Martin et al. (2016)
- Purple: Salazar-López et al. (2016)


c. Physical events




Task 1

Physical task (Ph)
"Where will it fall?"


Physical interactions (Ph)



Social interactions (So)



Color task (Co)
"More blue or yellow?"



Apraxia of tool use

Goldenberg's videos

12 weeks of training
3 days a week
20 to 40 min sessions

Step by step demonstration
or Training of details (teaching)

but...
on how to make tea

This was a **transfer** task

The activity is degraded over time (6 months after the rehabilitation),
if not practiced daily

Instructions:

Work vs do not work



**Machine transparent condition
(Do not work)**

→ *Transparent*